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NOTES

nationally circulated magazines do not come within the prohibition of the statute
because prospective jurors would not be considered a part of a court convened.
And since these publications are not addressed to any particular pending action,
the test of physical proximity is not met. Coupled with the fact that the state
courts are bound by our present national policy relating to the freedom of speech
and press, it must be concluded that the case against the insurance companies is
considerably weakened. Though there has been no United States Supreme Court
decision on these cases, it is difficult to see how criticism of excessive jury awards
could obstruct the administration of justice. This thought was aptly put by a
federal judge of the District Court of Pennsylvania when he said:
"We are not certain that those advertisements will have the effect claimed by the
plaintiffs on prospective jurors; they may resent being told that prior juries have been
sentimental and have made excessive awards contrary to law."' 17

R. S. Kuyumjian
LABOR LAW: ORGANIZATION OF WORKERS WORKING HOURS -

ANTI-UNION SPEECH DURING

UNION EQUIVALENT OPPORTUNITY TO REPLY.

In a recent United States Court of Appeals decision, National Labor Relations
Board v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,' the Court denied enforcement of an order of the
National Labor Relations Board restraining an employer from applying its nosolicitation rule. The rule denied the right to campaign for union organization.
The Court ruled that an employer, a variety store company, whose agent had made
a protected anti-union speech to employees on the premises during working hours
was not required to relax the no-solicitation rule. Further, the Court held the
employer did not have to give equal opportunity to union representatives to speak
to employees on the premises during working hours.
The Labor Board had concluded that respondent's pre-election conduct violated Sections 8 (a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act.2 This section states
that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization and to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosinga The conduct which
the Board found violated the Act consisted of the company's refusal to permit the
umon to address its employees in the same manner as the manager of the store
had addressed them, while, at the same time, the management enforced its rule
prohibiting union representatives from soliciting its employees on company premises. This, the Board found, was a discriminatory application of the company's
rule against solicitation, and amounted to interference with the employees' rights
to the selection of a collective bargaining representative of their own choosing.
This position had been upheld in Bonwitt Teller v. National Labor Relations
Board.4 The dissent by Circuit Judge McAllister in the Woolworth decision also
took this position.
The Court in the Woolworth case contended that the ruling by the Board
17Hoffman v. Perrucci, 117 Fed. Supp. 38, 49 (EA.Pa. 1953).
1214 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954).
2 49 STAT. 449, 452 (1935), as amended by LM.RA., 1947, Public Law 101.
3 49 STAT. 452, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 69 STAT. 601
(1951), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1952).

4 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1952).
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ignored and nullified Section 8 (c), the free speech provision of the National Labor
Relations Act, 5 which is part of the amendment enacted June 23, 1947, and reads
as follows:
"The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissenation thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence
of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promse of benefit."

This section imposes no limitation upon the expression of the employer's view
except that it must not contain a threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
The Board conceded that the manager's speech contained no threats nor promises
and was protected by Section 8 (c) of the Act. But the Board ruled that a limitation exists to the effect that the employer who expresses such views on his premises must give equal time to the union to answer during working hours and on the
premises.
The Board had relied on a provision in the Federal Communication Act 6 that
when a candidate for public office is permitted to use a broadcasting station the
licensor must give an equal opportunity to all other candidates for the same office.
The Court of Appeals held this analogy was not in point.
The purpose of the enactment of Section 8(c) was to guarantee to employers
as well as to unions the right of free speech. In view of the legislative history, Section 8 (c) of the NLRA is a restatement of the principle embodied in the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 7 Its Addition to the NLRA is an
authoritative direction given by the Congress to the Board to apply the First
Amendment in behalf of the employer, as well as of the employee. The section was
enacted to remedy the situation which arose under the Wagner Act. The Board,
ruling under the influence of the unamended NLRA, had held it to be an unfair
labor practice for an employer to address his employees in opposition to a union,
even though his address was entirely noncoercive. 8

A short time after the enactment of Section 8(c), the Board ruled that an
employer could address its employees on the company's own time and property
without violating the purpose of the Act. 9 However, in the Bonwitt Teller case,
the Board reverted to its pre-amendment ruling and decided that such an address
was an unfair labor practice, unless the union was given an equal amount of time
to reply during working hours. The Board overruled the S&S Corrugated Paper
Machinery case, holding that employers speeches protected by Section 8 (c), cannot form the basis for a finding that the employer, by denying the union equal
opportunity to use its facilities and time, has interfered with the employees' free
choice of a bargaining representative. The Board relied on the Clark Brothers
case, 10 which had been condemned by the Congress. 1 The Court of Appeals for
549

STAT.

452, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 65 STAT. 601

(1951), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1952)
648 STAT. 1088, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1934), as amended, 66 STAT. 717 (1952), 47 U.S.C. § 315
(1952).
7 N.L.R.B. v Bailey Co., 180 F.2d 278 (6th Cir. 1950).
8 SEN. REP. No. 105 on Senate Bill No. 1126, Legislative History of Labor Management
Act 429 (1947).
9 The Babcock and Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948), S.&S. Corrugated Paper Machinery Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1363, 1364 (1950).
10 70 N.L.R.B. 60 (1946)
11 See note 8 supra.
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the Second Circuit affirmed in a two-to-one decision, Chief Judge Swan dissenting.
The majority of the Court based its decision on an interpretation of the Wagner
Act made by the courts prior to the Labor Management Relations Act of June 23,
1947 The Court held that the existing no-solicitation rule during both free and
working time was unfairly applied when the employer conferred on his own premises with his employees. The Board had previously ruled that it was an unfair
labor practice to relax the no-solicitation rule in favor of one union as against
another,'8 or favor certain parties as against others,12 but it had not decided that
the rule applied to an address by the employer. In its reliance upon the Clark
Brothers decision, the Board in the Bonwitt Teller case indicated its unwillingness to apply Section 8 (c) according to its terms.
The Court in the Woolworth case held that the dissenting opinion of Chief
Justice Swan in the Bonwitt Teller case is the correct view. Namely, that Section 8(c) has direct and controlling application and that a no-solicitation rule
cannot cut down the rights given the employer under Section 8(c).
If the employer here had made no speech, its exclusion of the umon from its
premises would have been legal under the no-solicitation rule, which the Board
conceded to be valid. However, this exclusion was converted into what the Board
found to be an unfair labor practice by linking up with the lawful exclusion, lawful utterances of the employer which contained neither threats nor promises of
benefit.
To compel the employer, if he exercises his right of free speech, to accord
union representatives a similar opportunity during working hours, limits the application of the freedom of speech provision written in Section 8 (c). The Republic
Aviation Corporationcase,14 decided at the same time as NationalLabor Relations
Board v. Le Tourneau Co.,15 held that employees could not be discharged for violating no-solicitation rules on their own time within the plant or premises of the
employer.
The Supreme Court has never held that the no-solicitation rule prohibits an
employer from conferring with his own workmen. The Court in the principle case
points out that the majority of the cases relied on by the Board were decided prior
to the enactment of the amendment. Moreover, that the decisions cited by the
Board presented situations so factually different that they could not be called controlling. There was no secondary boycott.16 No discrimnation between rival labor
unions is involved.' 7 This is not a case of a union assisted by the employer against
19
a rival union.' 8 No discrimination against an employee is alleged or proved. No
exceptional circumstances exist to limit access of the union to the employees who
live on the premises and are not readily open to contact by representatives of the
union. The premises are not a ship,20 nor a lumber camp, 2 ' nor a company-owned
2
1I
ntemational Assocation of Machinsts v. N.L.R.B., 311

U.S. 72 (1940).

'3N.L.R.B. v. Waterman Steamship Corporation, 309 U.S. 206 (1940).

14324 U.S. 793 (1945).

v. Le Tourneau Co., 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
10 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694 (1950).
15 N.L.R.B.

17 See note 13 supra.
I8 See note 12 supra.
19 See note 14 supra.
20 See note 13 supra.
21
N.L.R.B. v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948).
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and company-dominated town.2 2 These cases lay down the rule that, when the
employees live upon premises owned by the employer, controlled by him, and
removed from contact with the outside world, reasonable access must be given
union organizers.
The Court concluded that to decide that a no-solicitation rule deprives the
employer of the right to confer with his employees about any important matter,
including unionization, is to deprive him of the freedom of speech specifically
guaranteed by the Constitution and by Section 8 (c) of the NLRA. The Board is
not authorized to write into the Act a limitation that does not exist.
Circuit Judge Miller in a concurring opinion points out that it is conceded by
the Board that, in the absence of a rule prohibiting solicitation of employees on
company property on other than working time, an employer does not commit an
unfair labor practice if he makes a pre-election speech on company time and premises to his employees and denies the union's request for an opportunity to reply 2
However, it was held m the Bonwitt Teller case, mentioned above, which ruling
was followed in NationalLabor RelationsBoard v. American Tube Bending Co.,2
that the existence of a rule prohibiting solicitation of employees on other than
working time changed the refusal by the company of the union's request from a
valid refusal into an unfair labor practice. This Judge Miller feels is not an illegal
discrimination but a reasonable construction of the Act.
In the Livingston Shirt Corporationcase, referred to above, a company rule
prohibited activities for or against any union during working hours. The nonobservance of the rule by the employer, and the denial by the employer of the
union's request for a similar use of the premises was held not to be an unfair labor
practice. In the American Tube Bending Company case, mentioned above, the
Court conceded that if the no-solicitation rule had been limited to working hours,
it would have been a valid rule and the refusal by the employer of the union's
request would not have been an unfair labor practice. Basically, the Court felt
that the validity of the Board's ruling rested upon the alleged invalidity of the
rule, in that it prohibited any use of the employer's property, even during nonworking hours. The enforcement of this rule clearly interfered with the employees'
right to engage in union activities.2 But in the present case, due to the nature of
the business, such a rule which prohibits solicitation both during working hours
and non-working hours is not invalid, 26 because this is a retail store. In addition,
the employers address complained of was delivered during working time and his
refusal to allow rebuttal pertained to working time only That portion of the rule
pertaining to non-working time was not involved and was not enforced. That portion of the rule which was enforced was a valid regulation.
The judge concluded that discrimination against a union is not an unfair labor
practice per se. Nor did the refusal by Bonwitt Teller interfere with the exercise
by the employees of their rights under the NLRA. Interference on the part of the
employer means something more than opposition to the union. Neither the Constitution, the Common Law, nor the Labor Management Relations Act confers
22 N.L.R.B. v. Stowe Spinmg Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1948).
23
24

Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 109 (1953).
205 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1953).

25 See notes 14 and 21 supra.
2
6 May Department Stores Co., 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946).
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upon employees the right to use for union purposes the property of their employer
during working hours, over the objections of the employer.
Circuit Judge McAllister, n a strong dissent states that there is no issue of
freedom of speech in the case, but that the question is whether the use of certain
campaigning methods is unfair. He relies on the statement of the policy of Congress, set forth in the Taft-Hartley Act to guide the courts. The Taft-Hartley
Act, amendatory of the Wagner Act, the original NLRA, declares it to be the
policy of the United States to encourage the practice of collective bargaining and
to protect the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing.2
Many labor cases involving "no-solicitation" rules have been before the courts
for adjudication, and such rules have been found non-discriminatory, or discriminatory, according to the varying circumstances of each case.28 Under normal conditions, solicitation may be properly limited to the employees' non-working time,
although even in these cases, such a reasonable rule may be administered in an
arbitrary and discriminatory manner.m Normally, an employer cannot forbid
union solicitation on company property during non-working time, even where
0
there is no showing that solicitation away from the plant would be ineffective.3
In department stores, a rule prohibiting union discussion and solicitation, at all
times, on the selling floors, has been held to be reasonable, in view of the presence
of customers at such places; yet, at the same time, such a rule prohibiting union
solicitation off the selling floors during non-working hours has been held invalid.3 '
In the Bonwitt Teller case, in speaking for the Court, Judge Augustus Hand,
referring to the company's availing itself of the privilege of prohibiting all solicitation on its premises, said:
"Bonwitt Teller chose to avail itself of that privilege and, having done so, was m our
opinion required to abstain from campaignng against the Union on the same premises
to which the Union was demed access; if it should be otherwise, the practical advantage to the employer who was opposed to umonization would constitute a serious
interference with the right of his employees to organize."

As mentioned above, the Bonwitt Teller case was followed in the Second Circuit
by National Labor Relations Board v. American Tube Bending Company. The
unfair labor practice upon which the Board's order was based was the making of
anti-union speeches while, at the same time, enforcing a rule prohibiting the solicition of its employees on its premises at any time by umon representatives. The
Court was of the opinion that the actions were a serious obstruction to carrying
out the policy of Congress to encourage the practice of collective bargaining, and
to protect the exercise by workers of full freedom in selecting representatives of
their own choosing, and that such conduct constituted an unfair labor practice.
From the foregoing discussion, it appears the United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit are in disagreement. They do agree that the Republic Aviation case gives a union a presumptive right to solicit on company property during non-working time. And that
2749 STAT.

449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935), as amended, 61

(1952).
28

STAT.

136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151

N.L.R.B. v. Bersted Mfg. Co., 124 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1942) ; see also note 11 supra.
v. Peyton Packing Co., 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1944).
3 N.L.R.B. v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1946) ; see also note 13 supra.
29
N.L.R..
0

31 See note 26 supra.

